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Since the mid-1990s, the concept of ecosystem and environmental services has 
become increasingly popular, be it in academic or operational circles. Ecosystem 
services correspond to the benefits derived by mankind from biological processes 
enabling the functioning and maintenance of ecosystems (CGDD, 2010). The 
services provided by ecosystems are able to sustain or protect human production 
or consumption activities, or affect welfare in general (Dictionary of Environmental 
Economics, 2001). They are classed in four categories (MA, 2005): provisioning 
services for resources essential to agriculture and industry  (food: crops, 
livestock, fisheries, aquaculture, etc.; fibres: timber and firewood, cotton, silk; 
genetic resources; plant molecules for pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, green 
chemistry and biofuels, etc.), regulating services (air quality, local and regional 
climate, quantity and quality of water, erosion, waste disposal, natural risks, 
etc.), supporting services (soil formation, nutritional cycle development, etc.), and 
cultural services (aesthetic services provided by landscapes and animals, 
recreational and tourism services provided by natural sites, services of a spiritual 
or religious type, such as sacred forests). All these services include material and 
non-material benefits derived from ecosystems in their natural state or modified 
by human practices (Karsenty et al., 2009).  
The terms “environmental services” and “ecosystem services” are sometimes used 
interchangeably. However, FAO (2007) proposes to make a distinction between 
environmental services, considered as a subset, and ecosystem services which 
correspond to externalities7. Environmental services thus possess characteristics 
that make them more like public goods, which excludes provisioning services, 
which can be assimilated to private goods traded on markets.  
Jeanneaux et al. (due out) showed that the number of articles on ecosystem and 
environmental services in the international databases Web of Science and Scopus 
has increased nine-fold in ten years. Apart from scientific literature, a whole range 
of books and reports arising from institutional initiatives has been widely 
distributed and mediatized, such as the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2001-
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2005) (MA, 2005), The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB, 2010), 
the FAO report (2007) or the report by the French Strategic Analysis Centre 
(Chevassus-au-louis et al., 2009). Lastly, very many networks have been 
launched since the 2000s to simplify the promotion and operationalization of 
these concepts through biodiversity conservation policies and projects8. 
Economics played a major role in the birth of the ecosystem services concept and 
contributed to its dissemination and politicization (Méral, 2012). Yet, this concept 
does not seem to be totally stabilized and is subject to controversies, notably in 
the ecology field (Teyssèdre, 2010). Several operational stakeholders met during 
the Serena research programme9 emphasized that understanding of the 
ecosystem services concept and its insertion in public policies needed to be 
clarified10. The risk of seeing a transdisciplinary concept (along the lines of the 
ecological function concept) compromised, and especially of it being made into a 
vector for the promotion of market-based regulation instruments or for the 
requalification of public policy provisions as market-based instruments (MBIs), is 
often highlighted (Sullivan, 2009).  
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the market-based instruments applied to 
ecosystem services, along with their potentials and risks as regards sustainability 
requirements. It seems necessary beforehand to take another look at the 
different interpretations of the ecosystem services concept within the economics 
field, in order to more effectively analyse its politicization through the promotion 
of market-based instruments generally assimilated to payments for 
environmental services systems (Pagiola et al., 2004; Wunder 2005). The merits 
and limitations of such assimilation are discussed taking the case of 
environmental certification systems. 
 
 
2. The Economics view of ecosystem services 
 
Publication of the final Millennium Ecosystem Assessment report in 2005, was a 
key stage in the birth of the ES concept, but it was more a case of its  
politicization (in the same way as the Brundtland report for sustainable 
development) than its emergence as an actual scientific concept (Méral, 2012). If 
we are to understand the reasons for its mediatization since the turn of the 
century, it is important to consider the origin of its appearance in the academic 
                                                
8 In addition to the networks feeding the economics–environment interface debate (Ecosystem 
Valuation, Earth Economics, Earthtrends, etc.) or those that are more media-oriented (Guardian 
Environment Network, Business Green.com, Ecoworldly, etc.), it is worth mentioning those directly 
geared towards conservation funding: Conservation Finance Alliance, Katoomba group, Ecosystem 
Marketplace, Avoided Deforestation Partners, BBOP Learning Network, Nature Valuation and 
Financing Network, etc., which were virtually all created in the mid-2000s. Their aim is to 
strengthen, promote and increase knowledge and skills on conservation funding issues and 
payments for ecosystem services. They also seek to persuade multinationals to invest in 
conservation (Méral, 2012). 
9 ANR Serena programme (Environmental services and use of rural areas). http://www.serena-
anr.org/  
10 In particular, the operationalization of the concept means specifying the links between 
ecosystems, ecological functions, and regulating and supporting services, which is necessary for 
knowing the conservation status of an ecosystem and thereby the services it will be able to provide 
in the future. 
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and economic sciences field. Another key stage was the appearance of the book 
by Daily and the article by Costanza et al. in 1997. 
In fact, from the end of the 1990s, the monetary valuation of services provided 
by ecosystems reconfigured the relations existing between environmental 
economics and ecological economics11. Indeed, many economists claiming to be 
from the latter school of thought consider today that monetary valuation is a 
road to be taken to influence political decision-making. For Spash (2009), these 
new “environmental pragmatists” choose monetary valuation to speak ”the 
language of the market place, accountants, financiers and bankers” (p.256). This 
stance, launched with the biodiversity programme of the Beijer Institute at the 
beginning of the 1990s and publication of the article by Costanza et al. (1997) on 
the values of global natural capital and ES, was strongly backed and supported 
by conservation ecologists and biologists. The latter, who were greatly involved 
in the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment found in monetary valuation a way of 
alerting decision-makers to the economic stakes of conservation. The ES concept 
serves to illustrate how the erosion of biodiversity affects the ecosystem 
functions underlying services critical for human welfare. 
The objective sought by this “new economy of nature” to use the title employed 
by Daily and Ellison (2002), via the monetary valuation of ES, is to identify the 
costs generated by the absence or non-application of public policies intended to 
reduce pressure on ecosystems. The TEEB approach fits explicitly into this way of 
thinking, as highlighted by De Groot (2009, p. 5): “One of the aims of the TEEB 
study is to provide more and better data and understanding of the significance of 
these losses and the consequences of policy inaction on halting biodiversity loss 
at different scales (global, regional and local)”12.  
Likewise, the 2010 report by the Secretariat of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity entitled Global Biodiversity Outlook particularly emphasized the 
monetary value of ES. The merits of monetary valuation for integrating potential 
effects in terms of how projects and programmes impact on biodiversity are also 
being increasingly acknowledged. For instance, the report by the French 
Strategic Analysis Centre published in April 2009 formed part of this perspective, 
by highlighting the usefulness of monetary valuation in public decision-making 
processes, particularly for an ex-ante assessment of policies and projects 
(Chevassus-au-Louis et al., 2009).  
The different economic assessment exercises undertaken on national and 
international scales thus fit into a perspective of enhancing awareness: it is a 
matter of putting a figure on the value of ecosystem services to show their 
economic importance and the costs generated by their deterioration or 
destruction. Initially, they were more in response to a pragmatic objective of 
                                                
11 Theoretical divergences within environmental and natural resource economics led to a split. 
Some authors, influenced by systemic ecology and by heterodoxical economics focusing on 
human-nature interactions, began to lay the foundations of contemporary ecological economics 
(Røpke, 2004). Ecological economics is quite an unorthodox school of thought that looks at 
conditions for coevolution between ecosystems and economic systems. As noted by Froger (2008), 
while some are interested in the biophysical dimensions of economic activity and study the 
ecological limitations of human activity (via bioeconomic models) (Costanza et Daly, 1992), others 
place emphasis on institutional issues associated with the regulation of natural resources (Costanza 
et al., 2001), along with the redistributive challenges of environmental issues (Martinez-Alier, 
2002). Ecological economists recommend using not only monetary valuations but also qualitative 
evaluations, integrated within multi-criteria analyses (Froger, 2005). 
12 See also the European study entitled “The Cost of Policy Inaction” (Braat and ten Brink, 2008). 
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mobilization, rather than being an end in themselves (Daily et al., 2009). This 
economic approach predominates, even though their impact in decision-making 
terms remains weak, notably due to their static nature, the fact that they do not 
take into account threshold effects and an absence of monitoring, as shown by 
Fisher et al. (2008) based on an analysis involving 34 case studies of ES 
valuation13. By adopting such a stance rather than taking a holistic approach, 
from which the ecosystem concept was derived, economic analysis favours an 
anthropocentric vision with, on the one hand, the monetary valuation of ES (total 
economic value) and, on the other hand, the promotion of new market-based 
instruments designed to encourage the maintenance or production of an 
optimum level of ES. This dominant vision explains the tendency to favour an 
approach to ES from an externalities viewpoint rather than a broader vision of all 
the services provided by ecosystems. 
In the economics of externalities, ES are conceived by way of the externality 
concept, which defines them with the help of two conditions (Baumol and Oates, 
1988 p. 17):  
 
- A condition (1) of existence (what the externality is): ”an externality is 
present whenever some individual’s (say A’s) utility or production 
relationships include real (non-monetary) variables, whose values are chosen 
by others (persons, corporations, governments) without particular attention 
to the effects on A’s welfare. (…) It should be noted also that this definition 
excludes cases for which an individual deliberately acts to affect the welfare of 
A”. 
- A condition (2) relative to the ineffectiveness of payment ”The decision-maker 
whose activity affects others’ utility levels or enters in their production 
functions, does not receive (pay) in compensation for this activity an amount 
equal in value to the resulting (marginal) benefits or costs to others”. 
If environmental services are considered to be externalities, their internalization, 
making it possible to fix them at an optimum level, assumes “payment” between 
the beneficiaries and the providers/producers of the services in question. The 
arrangements for such a transaction are variable and may take the form of a tax 
or subsidies, and may also involve a contract between the State and private 
operators, or even a direct contract between service producers and beneficiaries. 
The market-based instruments designed to promote positive externalities and 
reduce negative externalities are developed below. 
By taking a service economy14 or package economy approach (Moati, 2008), 
another, more relevant qualification of ES can be proposed for analysing other 
types of market-based instruments – those involved in environmental labelling, 
and they are examined in the final section of this paper. ES can thus be qualified 
                                                
13 In fact, the monetary valuation of ES gives rise to debates on the technical, ethical and 
pragmatic dimensions of the calculation methods (Méral, 2012). How can ecosystems, which are  
dynamic and stochastic by nature, be assessed? Are not the anthropocentric and utilitarian 
undercurrents of the monetary valuation of ES questionable? Do they not entail the risk that 
measurement of the functional values of ecosystems in particular will be side-lined? How efficient 
are such measurements? Are they not likely to give the illusion of an ecological equivalence 
between natural assets that are subject to different threats, hence requiring varying degrees of 
protective efforts? See the special issue of Ecological Economics (1998), 25(1). 
14 The service economy (du Tertre, 2010) is a fairly recent school of thought in economics. It 
involves selling “services” (sometimes called “solutions”) to users/consumers, rather than goods or 
services separately.  
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in terms of functionality. In this perspective, a product, agricultural for example, 
is not just a mere tangible good, it may also guarantee the respect of different 
clauses, or the adoption of values relative to supply chains and production 
process (genetic resources, animal feed, veterinary products, seeds, 
phytosanitary products, etc.). In recent years, growth in the content of 
information available for agricultural products bears witness to such a structural 
change: there is “tertiarization” of agricultural products15: they incorporate new 
services, such as the preservation of health and of the environment (Nefussi and 
Aznar, 2007).  
Insofar as the different dimensions of the contribution made by agriculture are 
conceived and integrated into the product to meet consumer demand, 
agricultural products become “agricultural solutions” combining goods and 
services. What is produced and sold is a package of complementary services and 
goods (Moati, 2008; Jeanneaux et al., 2011), such as cashew nut chocolate, a 
product of organic agriculture derived from fair-trade. Payment for the service(s) 
incorporated into the product is usually procured through the consumer’s 
agreement to pay more for that product and the associated services. Certification 
by an independent third party reduces the asymmetry of information between 
the producer and the consumer by providing the consumer with a guarantee that 
the means employed by the producer, which may involve practices designed to 
help maintain the provision of one or more specified ecosystem services and 
which the consumer is paying for, are actually being respected16. The voluntary 
nature of these environmental labelling systems should be noted. 
However, ES issues in economics are usually very largely interpreted from the 
externality angle, without any major break from the tradition of environmental 
economics. How then are ES internalized through systems qualified as market-
based instruments? The “payment for environmental services” concept, initially 
introduced to designate intervention mechanisms resembling a private voluntary 
transaction, is currently tending to be used to requalify other private systems – 
environmental labelling of agrifood products targeting ecosystem management 
methods for example, but also some pre-existing public regulation mechanisms, 
notably agri-environmental measures (Engel et al., 2008). What are the 
objectives and implications of such requalification? What are the potentials and 
risks of these systems with regard to sustainability requirements? 
 
 
3. Payment for environmental services: what means for what 
ends?  
 
As highlighted by FAO in its 2007 report, PES are justified by the existence of 
positive externalities (to be encouraged) or negative externalities (to be reduced) 
induced by production activities (agriculture or forestry) which play a decisive 
role in spatial management. This justification is widespread in the literature. 
                                                
15 This tertiarization is also increasingly concerning the forestry sector. 
16 It needs to be pointed out that while the definition of certification is legally supervised, hence 
precise, initiatives designed to obtain labels are restrictive to varying degrees – except in the case 
of agrifood products where the use of the term label is, at least in Europe, limited to official labels 
of origin and of quality which are subject to regulations.   
Beyond Efficiency – Exploring the Political and Institutional Dimensions of Market-based Instruments for 
Ecosystem Services, International Workshop, 13-14 March 2012 
 
 6 
In PES schemes, the beneficiaries or buyers of environmental services 
compensate or remunerate the service providers or producers17. PES were 
initially defined as being voluntary transactions conditional upon clearly defined 
environmental services between a provider and a beneficiary (Wunder, 2005)18. 
PES are taken to be a transfer of resources between actors that is of an incentive 
nature, intended to reconcile individual and/or collective land use decisions with 
the social worth of sustainably managing natural resources and conserving 
biodiversity. They should (ideally) include an “additionality” dimension (bringing 
environmental gain when compared to an absence of any project19) and a 
“conditionality” dimension (there should only be payment once the service has 
been effectively provided). In this original acceptance, PES stood out from other 
environmental policy systems in that they were based on direct negotiation of a 
Coasian type between contractors to produce a given level of service (Muradian 
et al., 2010) fitting a beneficiary-payer logic rather than a polluter-payer logic20.   
“PES” terminology is not neutral (Karsenty et al., 2009). It suggests an implicit 
distribution of the rights and duties of those involved: who has the right to 
services, who has the right to pollute or degrade the environment, whether or 
not those responsible for the degradation must pay, who has the right to be paid 
for not damaging the environment, etc. (Swallow et al., 2007). “Payment” is the 
most frequent and generic term, but it is associated with the idea of 
remuneration likely to create conflicts (Wunder and Vargas, 2005). The term 
“market” (“Markets for Ecosystem Services (MES)”, (cf. EU emission trading 
system in 2005) suggests the idea of institutionalized competition between 
actors, whereas in reality it usually involves a contract signed between 
stakeholders (beneficiaries or providers) defined right from the start of bilateral 
negotiations. Moreover, in developing countries, the term “market” is often 
assimilated to a risk of the privatization of services which had hitherto been 
freely or cheaply accessible to the largest number of people (Wunder and Vargas, 
2005). Another term sometimes used in reference to PES is that of “reward”, 
which induces an idea of merit and justice (fair remuneration). As service 
producers are “rewarded” – even if providing those services does not cost them 
anything – it may lead to disputes when the expectations in return for that 
reward are not forthcoming (Swallow et al., 2007). Lastly, the term 
“compensation” is also used. It refers to the cost (direct or opportunity) that the 
service producer incurs to provide the service in question (change of location, 
practices, etc., or abandoning such changes). In such a perspective, only the 
service producer incurring the cost has the right to benefit from compensation 
(Swallow et al., 2007). 
                                                
17 The literature often uses the term “provider”, which seems problematic for cases where the 
agent is paid for reducing pollution. The term “producer” seems more neutral and, moreover, refers 
to the fact that the economic operators remunerated by PES are virtually always producers in the 
economic sense (loggers and farmers in particular) (Laurans et al., 2011). 
18 Following criticism, notably from Muradian et al. (2010), Wunder (2011) reformulated his 
definition: the transaction is “voluntary” to a certain degree for the buyer and entirely so for the 
producer; the environmental service may be specific or make up a “basket”; the service may be 
bought by the buyer (beneficiary) or by a public body; it is “provided” by a producer or a 
community; conditionality underlies the conception and functioning of the systems. 
19 Demonstrating additionality means defining a “scenario without a PES project” and comparing it 
to a “scenario with a project” and deducing the “net effect” of the PES project forming the 
additional component. 
20 Although the “polluter pays” principle is sometimes applied to justify payment by the 
beneficiaries of services, as in Costa Rica with the fossil fuel tax, paid back into the PES system. 
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The term PES is also used to qualify systems of a very different nature. Laurans 
et al. (2011) thus distinguished between four types of PES. “Voluntary and 
bilateral” PES (private contracts and bilateral agreements with the example of 
Vittel, contracts for the provision of services with the example of conservancies 
in Namibia, environmental certification), “voluntary and collective” PES 
(corresponding to voluntary and conscious contributions by different consumers, 
not necessarily beneficiaries, to remunerate practices producing an ES, cf 
donations to WCS used to protect birds’ nests in Cambodia), “compulsory and 
bilateral” PES (mechanisms that organize an exchange between two uniform 
groups of economic stakeholders, with compulsory payment, cf. taxes or user 
charges for water consumption imposed by public services and used to 
remunerate practices protecting the water source upstream), and “compulsory 
and collective” PES (based on compulsory contributions, levied without any direct 
link with the service, to remunerate practices, cf. “collective” obligations, taxes 
levied and public subsidies assigned to payments for “good practices”). 
In fact, since the turn of the century, there has been a multiplication of PES 
contracts in Latin America (Corbera et al., 2007; Kosoy et al., 2007; Pagiola, 
2008; Wunder and Alban, 2008; Rapidel et al, 2011), Africa (Sommerville et al., 
2010; Wendland et al., 2010) and Asia (Bennett, 2008; Adhikari, 2009). They 
cover a very broad spectrum ranging from national programmes managed by 
governments21 to local projects of more limited scope and tending to be funded 
by the private sector or cooperation agencies. The different elements of 
Wunder’s definition of PES apply more or less depending on the number and type 
of ES involved (on the nature of the service approaching the characteristics of a 
public good – depending on the degree of rivalry and/or exclusivity of the 
beneficiaries), the payment mechanisms used (by the beneficiary or by tax), and 
the number of buyers (public or private, direct or intermediate beneficiaries) and 
vendors (producers) involved in the transaction (Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002; 
Wunder, 2005; Engel et al., 2008).  
In industrialized countries, promotion of the ES theme is usually reflected in a 
requalification of pre-existing public intervention systems, particularly in 
agriculture. The “PES” found in the literature are thus usually existing 
instruments, whose purposes have been reformulated in terms of promoting ES. 
This is particularly the case with certain agri-environmental measures established 
in Europe and the United States (Baylis et al., 2008). It involves internalizing a 
positive production externality within agricultural policies, with those externalities 
being requalified by numerous authors as “environmental services” (e.g. Madelin, 
1995; FAO, 2007) or as “environmental goods and services” (Mahé, 2001) 
without, moreover, making any distinction between goods and services. Work by 
the OECD on rural amenities (OCDE, 1994) and on the multifunctionality of 
agriculture (OCDE, 2001) also fits in with this perspective. ES can thus be used 
                                                
21 Costa Rica is a pioneering country in implementing PES through a national PES programme (or 
PSA – Pago por Servicios Ambientales) launched in 1996 by forestry law 7575 with a view to 
halting deforestation (Daniels et al., 2010; Legrand et al., 2011). The national forestry finance fund 
(FONAFIFO), the trust fund in charge of PES programme management, buys from landowners 
(usually private individuals) services generated by certain land uses. For instance, several types of 
land use can qualify for payments: (1) reforestation through plantations (since the forestry law), 
(2) conservation of existing forests (since the forestry law), (3) natural regeneration of forests 
(since 2005), (4) agroforestry systems (since 2003), (5) sustainable logging (introduced by the 
forestry law, withdrawn in 2002 and reinstated in 2010). The PES programme requalifies the 
former systems implemented in Costa Rica to control deforestation (Le Coq et al., due out). 
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as a new element to justify agricultural subsidies and support measures for 
farmers that are sometimes challenged because of the distortions they are likely 
to generate for competition. Requalifying them as PES makes it possible to 
present them expressly as market-based instruments and not as protectionist 
tools. The argument in defence of environmental protection gives way to a more 
positive discourse on the promotion of ecosystem services and an incitement to 
produce them. 
Alongside these public agri-environmental measures, there are some rare cases 
of PES linked to private voluntary contractualization. They arise from “private”, 
“self-organized” bilateral negotiations resembling the Coasian model (Coase, 
1960). The example always cited in France is that of the contract concluded 
between farmers located in the catchment area of the Vittel spring and the 
Bottling Company for Vittel mineral waters. It is in fact the one that most 
resembles the PES promoted in developing countries and which is therefore most 
easily identified as such by international observers (Landell-Mills and Porras, 
2002; Perrot-Maître, 2006; Engel et al., 2008). 
The relevance and effectiveness of PES are the subjects of lively debates. 
According to Wunder (2005) and Laurans et al. (2011), they have great potential 
for halting the degradation of natural resources, attenuating the imperfections 
and limited successes of integrated conservation and development projects 
(ICDP) or sustainable management of resources, and mobilizing additional 
financial resources. They would also appear to have certain social potentials, 
especially in developing countries: diversification of incomes and activities, job 
creation, capacity building (Froger and Maizière, 2012). Some authors, such as 
Sembrès (2007), Karsenty et al. (2009), Muradian et al. (2010), Legrand et al. 
(2011), are more sceptical about their effectiveness (ability to meet contractual 
environmental objectives22), their efficiency (ratio of achieved effectiveness to 
investment made), their equitable nature, their legitimacy and their longevity. 
They express reservations about the results expected from PES, highlighting the 
difficulties encountered in implementing this mechanism (scientific uncertainty, 
inadequate ecological knowledge, high transaction costs, inappropriate 
methodology for controlling the status of environmental services, etc.) or in 
identifying their perverse effects (hijacking and appropriation of the instrument 
by stakeholders who are not initially targeted, funding capture strategies, 
weakening of public authorities and the role of environmental policies, 
degradation of ecological systems, slow-down in the development of new more 
sustainable practices, commodification of biodiversity, worsening of inequalities, 
etc.).  
What is probably most notable about PES, and for which there is consensus in 
the literature, is the diversity of the systems in which they take shape. It is 
impossible to make an overall judgment on the virtues or problems assignable to 
such a mechanism. Its effectiveness, its efficiency and its redistributive impacts 
can only be appraised for particular forms of instruments. This is what we 
propose to illustrate using the example of environmental labelling/certification23. 
What are its main characteristics? Have the different types of 
labelling/certification and their purposes been redefined in favour of the 
                                                
22 For example, the link between PES and changes in stakeholder behaviour is subject to debate: 
the lack of additionality in some PES is sometimes pointed out, notably for national PES like those 
in Costa-Rica (Wunder et al., 2008) or Mexico (Alix-Garcia et al., 2009). 
23 For a comparison of PES and environmental certification, see Le Coq et al. (2011). 
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emergence and promotion of ES as the new frame of reference for environmental 
policies? What are the implications of such a requalification and its impacts with 
regard to sustainability requirements (environmental, economic and social)? 
 
 
4. The example of environmental labelling and certification as a 
market-based instrument for ES 
 
Environmental labelling and certification (eco-certification) of products24, which is 
now considered as a form of remuneration for the joint production of ES, has 
flourished. The number of systems and agrifood products involved, and the size 
of the market shares for those products, have grown continually since the 1980s, 
and especially in the last decade (IFOAM, 2011). Environmental labelling and 
certification systems developed well before the promotion of ES and were 
originally associated with other forms of justification: such as food safety for 
human health (organic agriculture), equitable commerce or poverty alleviation 
(fair-trade), etc. However, they are tending to be increasingly referred to in 
relation to ES (Soto and Le Coq, 2011). In this perspective, one might wonder 
about their possible requalification.  
Labelling and certification systems are intended to ensure information for 
consumers and establish a relationship of confidence with producers regarding 
the characteristics and attributes of products (Ponte, 2004). The attributes of 
products can be defined as their ability to be checked by the consumer; a 
distinction is generally made between search attributes (verifiable at the time of 
the transaction), experience attributes (verifiable after the transaction and 
consumption of the product) and credence attributes (which are not verifiable 
and assume confidence in the producer) (Nelson, 1970). These attributes may be 
linked to the product itself, or to its production and processing. 
Generally speaking, certification is a procedure whereby a third party provides a 
written guarantee that a product, process or service complies with a specific 
standard, based on an inspection conducted according to an appropriate 
procedure (Bass et al., 2001 – quoted by Taylor, 2005). Labelling procedures 
may be less restrictive than certification procedures. 
First of all, environmental labelling and certification are a response to the 
changing demands of consumers. In recent decades, they have evolved to take 
into account not only the intrinsic characteristics of products, but increasingly 
their extrinsic characteristics (effect of the production process on the 
environment, social conditions of workers, animal welfare, etc.). Numerous 
ecolabelling systems have developed, the oldest one being that of organic 
agriculture. Its creation, primarily in Europe and the United States, fits in with 
the search for safer and more sustainable agrifood systems that respect organic 
processes and integrate them (Raynolds, 2000). The promotion of this new form 
of agriculture took of with the creation of the International Federation of Organic 
Agriculture Movement (IFOAM) in 1972, notably in developing countries. Today, 
                                                
24 Only the certifications and labels intended to differentiate agricultural and agrifood products 
incorporating an environmental dimension in their specifications are considered here. Geographical 
indications are not included, though some encompass an environmental component (Boisvert and 
Caron, 2010). Likewise, the standards of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 
regarding the environmental management of companies, such as ISO 14000, are not included.  
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on most major consumer markets in the world, organic agriculture is subject to 
public regulation (labels exist alongside private certification marks which 
launched the development of organic agriculture) (IFOAM, 2011). Free trade 
certification and marks are today sometimes seen as possible tools working for 
environmental conservation (Boisvert and Caron, 2010). Yet, the guarantees 
offered by such certifications only concern the social organization of production 
and the sharing of added-value throughout the supply chain. However, the best 
known fair-trade organization (Fairtrade Labelling Organization – FLO), founded 
in 1989, encourages all its members to seek double certification (equitable and 
organic) to more effectively meet consumer requirements. Beyond organic labels 
and environmental certifications, numerous marks and new certification 
instruments have developed since the end of the 1990s for many products25.  
Environmental certification is related to PES in that, like them, it is an instrument 
of positive economic incentives, based on voluntary membership26 and directly 
geared towards conservation (Wunder, 2006). Certification, through the higher 
selling prices it is supposed bring, is meant to enable remuneration for the 
efforts made by producers, who contribute towards environmental protection by 
respecting specifications, just like PES remunerate users of forest or rural areas 
for producing ES. Lastly, they are voluntary and conditional contractual 
instruments, insofar as remuneration for efforts depends on the conformity of 
practices27 (objective of means) implemented by the beneficiary (service 
producers/certified product producers).  
However, unlike PES which are designed for a given area, environmental 
certification marks and labels are not linked to a territory (Wunder, 2006; Le Coq 
et al., 2011). They are also adapted to the expectations of consumers – usually 
living in industrialized nations (Europe, United States, Japan) – and therefore 
depend on the market on which the products are traded. Thus, there can be no 
modulation of rules depending on local conditions and on more precise 
conservation objectives, as in the case of PES. In addition, the amount received 
under PES is fixed by contract, which is not the case for the amount of the 
premiums linked to certification. These premiums are not guaranteed, they 
fluctuate depending on supply and demand, and depending on the balance of 
power between the different actors in the supply chain28. In addition, the 
premium is not guaranteed over time, unlike for PES where payments are made 
                                                
25 For example, in the coffee sector, which is one of the most important products in international 
trade, in addition to organic labels and environmental certifications there are, today, 6 other 
certifications, such as Bird Friendly created in 1998 by the Smithsonian Migratory Bird Centre, Utz 
Kapeh (today Utz Certified) created in 1999 by a group of European retail and distribution 
companies, Rainforest Alliance created in 2003 by the Sustainable Agriculture Network (SAN), 
C.A.F.É. practices (Coffee and Farmer Equity practices) created in 2004 by the Starbucks company, 
the Common Code for Coffee Community - 4C, created in 2005 by private companies and 
international organizations in the coffee sector with the backing of German cooperation and, more 
recently, Nespresso AAA certification by the Nestlé company in 2006 (Muradian and Pelupessy, 
2005; Raynolds et al., 2007; Soto and Le Coq, 2011). 
26 Although, in some cases, environmental certifications can be considered as import barriers. For 
example, it is impossible today to export pineapples to the European market if producers do not 
have Global Gap certification. 
27 Practices that are subjected to rules set down beforehand in the PES procedures manual, or in 
the standard or specifications in the case of Eco-labels. The conformity of practices is checked by 
accredited certifying bodies (certification by third parties in the case of Organic Agriculture). 
28 Only fair-trade offers a minimum price and premiums fixed in advance. Be that as it may, as for 
other types of certification, producers have no guarantee in terms of outlets. It may prove 
impossible for them to sell all their production in the fair-trade circuit.  
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on the basis of multiannual contracts. The producers of certified products (ES 
providers) therefore bear the transaction risk, which is not the case in PES 
systems. Moreover, while contract supervision costs are payable by the PES 
system manager, certification costs are payable by the producers29.  
Like PES, environmental labelling and certification are not a uniform category. 
Certifications are a matter for private operators: the specifications, criteria and 
reference documents whereby products are assessed are many. For each 
product, each body has its own rules and standards. As for labels, they are public 
in the agrifood field: they are official signs adopted as part of national or 
European public policies. They therefore differ from one country to the next. 
Labels and certifications are diversified. They are a field of analysis in themselves 
and are subject to numerous debates about their effectiveness and efficiency 
(Bass et al., 2001; Grolleau et al., 2004; Nebel et al., 2005; Le Coq et al., 2011).  
The environmental effectiveness of environmental labelling and certification, 
which rely on an obligation of means (respect of generic specifications) is in fact 
challenged. Whilst work undertaken in industrialized countries in particular on 
organic agriculture has revealed the positive impacts of organic agriculture 
specifications in maintaining a certain number of ecosystem services (Fleury, 
2011), in developing countries a lack of knowledge is found about the links 
between soil use and the provision of services30. In addition, the link between 
certification and the actual change in behaviour and practices of stakeholders 
newly entering such systems is questioned. Only certain certifications are 
intended to generate substantial changes in practices and guarantee the effective 
provision of ES (e.g. Bird Friendly certification)31. The multiplication of eco-labels 
and/or certifications involving private marks, resulting from differentiation 
strategies based on commercial motivations and which are less ambitious in 
terms of guaranteeing the effectiveness of that link, has been encouraged by an 
increase in demand for these environmental characteristics (IFOAM, 2011), which 
constitutes a substantial market niche for agricultural and agrifood products. 
The second debate concerns the efficiency of the systems, in financial terms on 
the one hand, and in terms of efficiency compared to other systems on the other 
hand. For environmental certification, the main criterion is transmission of the 
premium paid by consumers to producers, bearing in mind the balances of power 
within the supply chains considered and operating conditions on the market (Le 
Coq et al., 2011). In fact, given the multiplicity of middlemen and the 
asymmetry of power in international supply chains, there is not necessarily a 
close correlation between the payment granted by consumers and the difference 
received by the producer. 
                                                
29 Except when it is covered by cooperation programmes, or as part of incentives for conversion to 
organic in the case of fair-trade. 
30 In particular, although the link between soil use and carbon fixation is relatively well defined for 
most ecosystems and easily measurable, and the link between soil use and biodiversity is also 
identifiable and measurable (Hui et al., 2008), albeit more complex, that of soil use and hydraulic 
service is often difficult to demonstrate given the complexity of hydraulic functioning (Chomitz and 
Kumari, 1998; Bruijnzeel, 2004; Chagoya, 2008). 
31 A case study on coffee showed significant differences in practices between certified and 
non-certified producers (notably in organic agriculture) (Quispe, 2007). However, it is difficult to 
establish a cause and effect relationship between certification and positive impacts on the 
environment. Does certification lie behind environment-friendly practices or does certification 
intervene where those practices already exist? 
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Lastly, eco-label systems are the subject of a third debate about their role in 
alleviating poverty and reducing inequalities. In this field, whilst the potential 
contributions of such systems are acknowledged, notably in reducing the 
vulnerability of producers (Bacon, 2005), many limitations are highlighted, such 
as the low production intensity of small-scale producers (Valkila, 2009) or low 
productivity in the case of certification (Haggar and Soto, 2011). 
The certification tool also has some limitations inherent to a system based on 
supply and demand for certified products. The certification system is limited by 
demand, i.e. the capacity of the markets to absorb certified products, and 
consumers’ agreement to pay for these types of products. Indeed, despite 
growing demand, certified production still outstrips the purchasing capacity of 
the markets. For example, when the market share of certified coffee underwent 
substantial development (Giovannucci, 2003), a large share of certified central 
American coffee production was not sold as such in 200632. In addition, the 
certification system is limited by supply in some cases, due to certification costs 
for producers33 leading to the smallest farms having difficulties in obtaining 
certification (Lescuyer et al., 2004), or to excessively limited advantages when 
costs are considered, compared to the conventional sector. Lastly, being based 
on trade, the certification system is affected by competition within the same 
market segment (e.g. fair-trade and/or organic coffee, or the multitude of rival 
standards in forestry). This competition between countries possessing 
contrasting comparative advantages (production factor costs – labour costs, 
access to inputs, etc.) and between producers with contrasting efficiency (due to 
different technologies) leads to an exclusion, selection and adjustment process 
which might thus lead to a trend (Villalobos, 2004; Killian et al., 2006). This 
process is likely to undermine the very principle of the system and its merits as a 
mechanism for compensating the efforts made by producers through practices 
helping to guarantee the perpetuation of ES (Le Coq et al., 2011). 
All these characteristics mean that, while there no doubt exist some analogies 
between environmental certification systems and PES, it is not possible to equate 
these two types of instruments. Not all the products arising from certified 
processes can be sold as certified products, given the limited demand. In other 
words, a given level of ES provision does not always lead to remuneration for 
producers. Next, the value of the premiums – supposed to represent 
remuneration for ES — depends at least as much on the degree of competition 
between producers as it does on objective production conditions — including the 
ES actually provided. Moreover, the premiums are distributed among the 
different stakeholders in the supply chain, so that only a fraction comes back to 
the producers, who are at the root of ES provision. It is therefore difficult to see 
certification as a market-based mechanism in which ES would be the purpose. 
Lastly, the sustainability of the certification system, beyond the mere financial 
aspects, depends on the ability to maintain its legitimacy in the eyes of the 
payers (consumers) and thus depends on the credibility of the system in terms of 
effectiveness and efficiency, and in terms of the institutions managing it. One 
might wonder what the new functions assigned to environmental certifications as 
                                                
32 In 2006, the volume of certified coffee production was up to six times greater than the volumes 
actually sold as certified products (authors’ estimation based on Pratt and Kilian, 2008). 
33 Under pressure from smallholders in developing countries, IFOAM launched a debate on 
collective or participatory certification initiatives to promote organic agriculture; this is also the 
case in industrialized countries with, notably, the initiative promoted by “Nature et Progrès” a 
private organic agriculture certification mark.  
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regards ES change in that respect. Does the fact of explicitly presenting them as 





Recent years have seen widespread experimentation with market-based 
instruments for the provision of environmental goods and ecosystem services. A 
wide range of mechanisms, such as payments for environmental services 
schemes, are therefore described as MBIs for ecosystem services. Many believe 
that market-based approaches can provide powerful incentives to conserve the 
natural environment and the public goods it provides, while at the same time 
offering new sources of income to support rural livelihoods. A review found 
almost 300 examples of such mechanisms worldwide (Landell-Mills and Porras, 
2002) and the list grows longer year on year. However, little attention has been 
paid to their emergence, design and performance and to the effects of the 
underlying pro-market narrative on conventional environmental policy 
instruments. Our paper aimed at deepening understanding of the discourse on 
and politics of MBIs for ecosystem services. 
We analysed the interpretation of the notion of ecosystem services in the field of 
economy. Since its inception, the notion of ecosystem services has been 
associated with the neoliberal turn in conservation policies. From this 
perspective, the sustainable provision of ecosystem services is hindered by 
market failures (e.g. public good attributes, externalities) and prices that do not 
capture the full value of the natural assets. Depending on how these issues are 
defined and prioritized, different types of institutional arrangements are 
suggested as policy tools. The craze for market development has also led to 
rethink and reword existing conventional policy instruments as MBIs. It has even 
encouraged a shift in these arrangements, instilling market attributes into them. 
Generalizations about the virtues and limitations of market-based instruments for 
improving the management of ecosystems and contributing to rural development 
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